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Abstract:  This paper is motivated by the  
general idea that philosophical ambition to 
understand and define the human mind exclu-
sively in terms of conscious, propositional, and 
deliberative behaviour cannot be adequate, for 
it leaves out great part of our mentality, which 
resides in the background. On a more specific 
plane it focuses on the background as a means 
of providing the cognitive organism with most 
plausible scenarios of reality, and prepares it 
for what appears most likely to be the case in 
the world, in an instant way and without engag-
ing in contemplation. The background proves to 
be a powerful instrument of initiating guess-
work and does it in automatic and effortless 
manner. In such a way this backgrounded “rea-
son” acts ahead of actuality and drives our 
behaviour and modes of our coping in the natu-
ral, social, and cultural world in an implicit way, 
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Resumen: Este artículo viene motivado por la 
idea general de que la ambición filosófica de 
definir y entender la mente humana exclusiva-
mente en términos de comportamiento cons-
ciente, proposicional y deliberativo no puede 
ser adecuada, pues deja inexplicada gran parte 
de nuestra mentalidad, la cual reside en el 
trasfondo. Más específicamente, el artículo se 
centra en el trasfondo como medio para propor-
cionar al organismo cognitivo los escenarios 
más plausibles de la realidad, y prepararlo para 
lo que más probablemente sea el caso en el 
mundo, de forma instantánea y sin entrar en la 
contemplación. El trasfondo demuestra ser un 
instrumento poderoso a la hora de hacer conje-
turas de una manera automática y espontánea. 
De esta forma, esta “razón” de trasfondo se 
anticipa en la práctica y conduce nuestro com-
portamiento y modos de habérnoslas con el 
mundo natural, social y cultural de forma implí-
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This paper is an attempt to provide a better understanding of the nature, 
forms of functioning, and import of the background (knowledge) as a sort of 
implicit reasoning that governs our actions without recourse to consciousness 
and contemplation, conceptual thought and deliberation. There are two basic 
premises on which it is founded: 
First, it relies on the conception of the mind understood as a form of active 
participation directed toward the environment and the world. If it is so then we 
need to explain what facilitates this activity and what sort of mental mechanism 
this engagement requires. Here I want to flesh out the idea that the back-
ground has a profound role to play in this process. On a general level, this pa-
per represents an attempt to locate the background in the world of human 
mentality; more specifically, it seeks to affirm the background as a sort of 
knowing that is instantly available and automatically operative without recourse 
to conscious deliberation. I want to suggest that the background is a massive 
and robust body of capacities which occupies most of what constitutes the mind 
but is never available in an explicit form. As Hubert Dreyfus rightly points out, 
it is essential that it remains hidden or “withdrawn”:  
 
Heidegger calls this ultimate background the phenomenon of world. He points out 
that the world must withdraw like the light in a room to make it possible for things 
to show themselves. Objects can be imagined, remembered and perceived on the 
background of a withdrawn world –a whole that functions only when one is not pay-
ing attention to it. On this view it follows that the background qua background can-
not be implicit because it cannot be made explicit and still be identified with what it 
was when it was doing its job as background. In short, the background is present 
by way of withdrawing, and it is only when it is present in this way that it can serve 
as the ground for anything. (Dreyfus, 2012: 4). 
 
By putting the background to the foreground, that is by placing it in the fo-
cus of interest, I aim to emphasize the fact that much of what the cognitive 
organism knows, and is capable of achieving in its interactive exchange with 
the world, is available without awareness; that acting does not require a propo-
sitional plan; that doing can do without concepts. In whatever the cognitive 
organism does it relies on activation of the backgrounded suppositions that 
provide a form of implicit reasoning that guide our actions, mental and motor.  
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Second, there is nowadays enough support for the, by no means trivial, 
claim that there is a severe underdetermination of mental processes by sensory 
data. This implies that what matters for the organism as information is not giv-
en in sensory input, and also that meanings are not encoded in incoming stimu-
li. After all, “events don’t come labelled ‘stimulus’ or ‘response’” (Kirk, 1994: 
107) Very much in the similar vain C. I. Lewis observes: “Objects do not classi-
fy themselves and come into experience with their tickets on them” (1929: 88). 
Taking this into account adds to the conviction that the “given” is a questiona-
ble notion and that if there is any justified way to talk about the “labelling” and 
“ticketing” then it is to understand it as a sort of intervention coming from the 
inside rather than outside. Contrary to our common-sense understanding, very 
little is determined by the external stimulation alone; in other words, there is 
no (external) information in input. Input grows to become a bearer of meaning 
(or information) only within the cognitive system and according to what it 
makes out of it. Any idea of mirroring or faithful imitation is thus out of place 
here since our sensory and cognitive apparatus is not equipped for the passive 
pick up. More than deciphering what is actually the case, living organism, by 
making use of his or her background competence, figures out what might be 
the case in the world. This takes the form of a guesswork; rather than merely 
stating what is actually and literally going on in the senses the organism spon-
taneously creates scenarios of possible behavior. Because these scenarios are 
as a rule not products of “intellectualist” endeavors, I claim that the key for 
understanding the nature of human coping in the world is to be sought in the 
background capacities as a “tool of potentiality”1 that is instantly and effortless-
ly available even when non conscious thinking is at stake. Let us consider it as 
a “reason” that is powerful enough even if “hidden” or “withdrawn”, and even if 
unconscious, nonpropositional, and nondeliberative. 
 
 
2. GUESSWORK IN PERCEPTION AND ACTION 
 
In order to illustrate that the (visually) “given” is no bottom-rock of cogni-
tion and that appearances, no matter how supposedly immediate, may deceive 
us, let us consider the following example:  
 
 
1 See Radman (2012). 
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If you see a stick in the water, it looks curved, but if you know it is a stick, you 
know that you can grasp it the same way you would grasp a straight object. Stick 
in the water and out of the water look different, but they afford the same actions. 
(Prinz, 2009: 429)2  
 
The author makes here no reference to the background, but in my reading 
it is just the background knowing that enables one not to be deceived by the 
eye and conduct the appropriate action contrary to what the sight suggests. It 
seems, in this case, as if the hand knows its way around better than the eye. If 
it is so then the manual proves to act independently of what the sight conveys, 
and that might prove why the hand is not deceived by the eye. 
What follows from the underdetermination hypothesis is that the “given” 
appears to be a poor guide in deciphering the “real”, that inputs are not instruc-
tive unless there are means that can assist us in reading what they can possibly 
mean. So there must be competences more profound than those based on the 
sensory record; there must be a “knowing” or “reason” of some sort that ena-
bles an organism to act in the world independently of sensory images and ap-
pearances. 
Our theories of cognition are pronouncedly vision-centred3 and visual per-
ception dominates our philosophical accounts of knowledge of the world. How-
ever, vision, though important, is not an exclusive guide to action. There are 
ways of knowing the world, and coping with it, other than the ocular one, and 
the manual is one of them.  
We realize that what we see is influenced more by the function and possible 
use of objects than by their appearance and physical features alone. Having 
this sort of practical experience or knowledge of the immediate surroundings is 
what influences our attitude toward it and how to handle it. For instance, a 
plate may look elliptic to you, but you handle it as a round object. The car that 
is sighted as a tiny object on the horizon is experienced as distant, and not as 
miniature (as it approaches in your perception it does not grow in size, but is 
experienced as getting closer). You also see the moon as larger than the ob-
jects of the same optical size on the retina (for instance, a penny) because you 
 
 
2 Emphases added. 
3 See, for instance, Prinz (2013). 
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know it is a celestial body of certain dimensions, though you don’t have to 
compute the sort of knowing consciously but rather implicitly or in “back-
grounded” mode. 
We conclude that our dealing with the world is not decided according to 
what is presently going on in the photo-receptors, but rather according to the 
capacity of the organism to decipher the incoming stimuli in terms of their pos-
sible meaning, based on the embodied experiential record. It is this potentiality 
that shapes the contents of perception. In other words, what “is” is read in 
terms of what it might be. The contents of perception are created according to 
what seems most plausible to be the case. And plausibility might not even be 
judged on the actual sensory evidence (as in the case of the “bent” stick or “el-
liptic” plate), but on the appropriate guesswork. The latter, again, is not com-
puted in consciousness but is provided by the massive body of background. 
The neuroscientist Walter Freeman (1999a) points out that perception is 
about expectations. In a similar vain Alva Noë remarks that “(p)eople hear 
what they expect to hear” (2009: 109).  And we may further add, people see 
mostly what they believe is the case; they move around in the space oriented 
by what seems to be the most probable configuration of a surrounding; they 
enter social exchange through dialogues that are taken from the storage of ex-
pected stereotyped rhetoric samples. Chris Frith says that perception is based 
on beliefs (2007: 126) and John Searle, along similar lines, talks about “readi-
ness” (1995: Ch. 6).4 
Expectations are not provided by external stimulation but are generated 
from the repertoire of backgrounded possibilities. The process is a selective 
one; leaving out is as important as taking into account. Most of what is afforded 
in the world has to be ignored. In other words not everything that is going on in 
the external or internal world can matter for the conscious mind. Inhibition pro-
cesses are thus important because they protect the organism from the irrele-
vant. The type of the process is not conscious and is rather a sort of skill. As an 
illustration, consider Hubert Dreyfus’ example of the experience of a familiar 
type of room. He says: “We are skilled at not coping with the dust, unless we 
are janitors, and not paying attention to whether the windows are open or 
 
 
4 That is also how Freeman sees action, namely, as an act that “requires a prior state of readiness that 
expresses the existence of a goal, a preparation for motor action to position the sense organ […]” 
(1999b: 146, emphases added). 
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closed, unless it is hot, in which case we know how to do what is appropriate” 
(1993: xxviii)5. Appropriateness seems thus to be entirely contextual. What is 
habitual in one situation need not be so in another. For instance, the dressing 
“code” appropriate in the bathroom is entirely out of place at a cocktail party; 
to behave the same way at the basketball game and at the (classical) concert 
would be utterly inappropriate; to read aloud from the brochure during the the-
atre performance would be inappropriate, but reading it aloud back home to 
those who were not in the theatre would be appreciated; it is natural to dance 
at a party, but quite unnatural to do so at a meeting, etc. 
Many of these “norms” of behaviour are acquired by the background and 
need nor be attended or processed in (conscious) thought. We switch from one 
situation or life-circumstance to another with ease and routine that require no 
effort, and we do that all the time. We also switch our social roles (being 
daughters and sons, sisters and brothers, mothers and fathers, neighbours, 
colleagues, patients, pedestrians, drivers, travellers, etc.) with effortlessness of 
unreflected routine. We normally do that successfully but if we do not tune in 
on time or mass up the roles we will soon get to learn about out inappropriate 
behaviour from the reaction of other people.  
Interesting enough, if one is to consult more recent empirical research, the 
lesson one can learn is that ever more scientific findings speak in favour of the 
view that what the neural system does is to prepare the organism for the “next 
step” in agent’s acting in the world. It does so by self-generating options that 
instruct the organism what to expect in the world and how to proceed in dealing 
with possible situations. As the neuroscientist Walter Freeman puts it: “All that 
brains can know has been synthesized within themselves in the form of hypoth-
eses about the world and the outcomes of their own tests of the hypotheses, 
success or failure, and the manner of failure” (1999a: 121)6. It seems that it is 
much more important for the organism to be prepared to what it can expect in 
the world rather than being attentive to what is actually and accurately the 
case in the surrounding world.  
This motivates us to re-examine the very notion of environment as a form 
of the actually given in sensation. Such a depersonalized environment is a myth 
 
 
5 Emphases added. 
6 Emphasis added. See also Roth (1996: Ch. 6). 
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for what surrounds us is shaped and reshaped according to agent’s interests, 
needs, demands, desires, etc., none of which are provided in external stimula-
tion. Nothing is simply there unless there is a “reason” for an organism to allow 
it to matter to it in some way. Environment is thus no neutral or static scenery 
but rather a medium that accommodates to life situations. Environment is a 
“matter of choice”, says Erich Harth in a succinct way (1993: 118). Even when 
the “choice” is not volitional or conscious (what is most often the case), it pre-
supposes an engagement of a complex mechanism of guesswork that entails 
inhibition of the irrelevant, selection from memory, and projection of the possi-
ble. Guesswork helps us to make corrections and improve steps in adaptations 
and so better tune to the given* situations. Again, the sort of know-how is not 
processed in the “higher cognitive centres” but is rather a result of a back-
grounded capacity available instantly and effortlessly, that is without engaging 
conscious thought or contemplation.  
From what has been said thus far it follows that environment, far from be-
ing offered up for passive uptake or faithful representation, is something to be 
figured out in terms of backgrounded bets about the most likely version of what 
there “is”. What is at stake here is, basically, guesswork – an estimate or infer-
ence about the most probable states and situations of the natural and social 
environment. But this, as already pointed out, is mostly not computed in con-
scious thought; the vast majority of this type of mental activity resides outside 
the margins of conscious awareness. The “reason” that drives our behaviour is 
implicit and generally not available in the foreground. I particularly want to em-
phasize that the first step in the process is always a guess. In a way we can say 
that it is first the future, and then what of it applies to the present. In such a 
way we are prepared for experience that is to come. The organism guesses the 
possible and then checks what of it matters as the actual. 
Now we might ask ourselves, how the biological organism, including its 
neural structure, copes with the sort of demand; that is with the hypothesis 
that securing the future is for the sake of adaptability to the actual. In other 
words, we want to know whether this type of mental mission has any support in 
empirical studies. Surprisingly (or not) more recent neurophysiological sources 
offer data that speak in favour of such a model. For instance, if we have come 
to the conclusion that the gist of mentality is anticipation without reflection, we 
learn from those studies that this is precisely what the neural apparatus does: 
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“The brain and body anticipate inputs, perceive, and make movements without 
need for reflection” (Freeman, 1999a: 23)7. We further see that “our experi-
ence of the visual world in rich detail is an experience of what is potentially 
available to us rather than what is already represented in our brain” (Frith, 
2007: 44)8. What the neural system does, then, is provide “a map of signs 
about future possibilities” (ibid: 98). For Erich Harth, “[t]he future is, in fact, 
already present in our mind, and hence in the nervous system, before it hap-
pens in the world of objects” (1993: 95)9. Indeed, “[i]t may even be said that 
future events affect present neural activity, because the brain – joyfully or fear-
fully – anticipates, projects into, the future” (ibid: 61). Richard L. Gregory al-
ready recognized this as he said: “[O]bjects have pasts and futures; when we 
know its past and can guess its future, an object transcends experience and 
becomes an embodiment of knowledge and expectation without which life of 
even the simplest kind is impossible” (Gregory, 1966: 8).  
Proclaiming “future first” brings us away from the naïve conception of the 
given and of immediacy. Presenting the “given” in terms of the possible, actual 
in terms of the future, not only makes us aware that passive uptake cannot do 
the cognitive job but also that in order to be able to design the possible there 
must be an organ or capacity potent enough to provide such future actuality of 
which sensory apparatus is not (yet) informed. However, scientists and theo-
rists stop short of posing the question: What is the source of competence that 
provides information “beyond the (presently) given”? In other words, how is the 
“future” in this sense possible at all? I believe that, based on what has been 
said thus far, we are in the position to respond pretty unambiguously in the 
following way: the capacity for devising possible scenarios of the “real” is due 
to the massive background knowledge that provides a horizon of possibilities 
for reading stimuli and reacting to them in terms of what they most likely rep-
resent. If it is the background that provides the cognitive organism with the 
relevant knowledge of the possible then contrary to what the term denotes, it 
(back-ground) is not oriented towards the past but is entirely in the service of 
anticipation. The literal meaning of the term deceives us, insofar as it suggests 
recall of what happened in the past, when in fact it is better to think of it as a 
 
 
7 Emphasis added. 
8 Emphasis added. 
9 Emphasis added. 
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type of mental vehicle that is fully engaged in the organism’s preparation with 
respect to what is going to come.  
 
 
3. FROM THE BACKGROUND TO BEING-IN-THE-WORLD 
 
I believe that these novel findings capacitate us to reencounter Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophy from a contemporary perspective and provide us with a 
matrix of reading which may reveal profundity of his phenomenological in-
sights. Fortunately, phenomenology proves today to be inspirational also for 
fields, such as cognitive science, that practice empirical research and seemingly 
are distant to the spirit and methodologies of phenomenology. I want to make 
use of such a productive interdisciplinary opening and probe a mode of inter-
pretation that, in my view, can relate the sort of discussion above to some spe-
cific aspects of Heidegger’s difficult text. For instance, in Being and Time 
Heidegger repeatedly stresses that Dasein is always “beyond itself” (1962: 236) 
or that Being is, or acts, “ahead of itself” (Ibid.). I believe there is a way to un-
derstand this being “ahead” or “beyond” in the present context of background-
ed anticipatory aiming in the world. Though Heidegger’s reference is clearly to 
Dasein it is less clear what instances of it could be meant to perform this 
ahead-ness; that in turn leaves the space of interpretation open also to options 
such as advocated in this paper.   
Also, the very definition of the background as a tool of potentiality finds reso-
nance in Heidegger’s systematic insistence on potentiality as a feature of 
Dasein. He for instance says:  
 
This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. In each case 
Dasein has already compared itself, in its Being, and therewith for the possibility of 
authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concrete-
ness, in anxiety. But ontologically, being toward one’s own most potentiality-for-
Being means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself [ihm selbst … 
hinweg] in its Being. Dasein is always ‘beyond itself’ [über sich hinaus], not as a 
way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards the Po-
tentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being […] we shall denote as 
Dasein’s ‘Being-ahead-of-itself’ (Ibid.). 
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In such a way potentiality and “being-ahead-of-itself” are conceptualized as 
complementary aspects of Dasein. As if in need of further clarification he adds: 
“’Being-ahead-of-itself’ means, if we grasp it more fully, ‘ahead of itself-in-
already-being-in-a-world’” (ibid.) I believe that if we don’t want to leave this 
“already being in the world” to mysticism a way of understanding it is by re-
course to mechanisms of mind – which we find in backgrounded reason – that 
creates the horizon of possible behaviour to which the self need not to con-
sciously attend and is in that sense already provided for the mind. That this 
happens apart from volition can be deciphered from his saying: “Dasein can 
comport itself towards its possibilities, even unwillingly …” (1962: 237). 
Heidegger also characterizes the Self ontologically as “Being ahead of itself” 
(Ibid.)10. 
The motive re-emerges in the elaboration of the notion of wishing and will-
ing:  
 
In the wish Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities which not only have been 
taken hold of in concern, but whose fulfilment has not even been pondered over 
and expected. On the contrary, in the mode of mere wishing, the ascendancy of Be-
ing-ahead-of-oneself brings with it a lack of understanding for the factical possibili-
ties. (1962: 238)   
 
… to any willing there belongs something willed, which has already made itself defi-
nite in terms of a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ in general (Being-ahead-of-itself); (2) the 
discloseness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the 
‘wherein’ of Being-already); (3) Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly upon a 
potentiality-for-being toward a possibility of entity ‘willed’. In the phenomenon of 
willing, the underlying totality of care shows through. (1962: 239)   
 
In short, the lesson from the background and the excursion into the exis-
tential phenomenology seem to converge in the idea of potentiality of being as 
manifested in anticipatory capacity of the background that provides the horizon 





10 Emphasis added 
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4. ON AUTOMATICITY OF “JUST DOING” 
 
Unlike memory, which presupposes the recall or reconstruction of particular 
past episodes, the background presupposes an instantaneous and effortless 
activation of potentiality that provides options for motor and mental coping with 
life situations, and most often without conscious engagement. To say that 
something operates in an easy and effortless manner means that it is exercised 
automatically; and thus implies that it is performed without conscious aware-
ness and independent of control or deliberation. This, I think, can be best un-
derstood in terms of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reference to skills. Echoing Wittgen-
stein (1953), Searle also says that we know many things simply by doing.11 
I use the phrase “just doing” to refer in general to such reactions without 
reflection. But whilst many authors affiliate this sort of action primarily with 
motor habits, I am prone to extend the term far beyond bodily behaviour to 
include complex mental processes such as perception, memory, action, learning 
and thought but also to see it as a capacity responsible for our coping in the 
world in an easy-going and effortless way. “Just seeing” and “just thinking” 
would then mean that even complex cognitive operations such as visual percep-
tion and “reasoning” are not spared of skilled routines by which they are 
brought about. The ease of the doing is not only that of walking and typing, 
swimming and cycling, but also that of seeing, talking, remembering, imagin-
ing, deciding, aiming, etc. Effortlessness is not only to be affiliated with a phys-
ical skill but also with a mental habit; and the same can even be said of com-
plex cognitive processes and scientific enterprises, such as mathematics. As 
George Lakoff and Raphael Núñez put it: “Most cognition happens backstage. 
That includes mathematical cognition” (2000: 27). Analogously, we can say 
that just as we drink or drive, we also “just calculate” or “just infer” – or “just 
diagnose”. On this point, Michael Polanyi insightfully remarks: “The medical 
diagnostician’s skill is as much an art of doing as it is an art of knowing. The 
skill of testing and tasting is continuous with the more actively muscular skills, 
like swimming or riding a bicycle” (1958: 54). 
We can further extend this “just doing” by including something like “just 
judging” and it can also include aesthetic preferences. Why chamber music 
 
 
11 Searle, for instance, says: “[…] we don't need the walking rules in the first place; we just walk” 
(1983: 153). 
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“means” to me more than opera? Why Bach excites me more than Brahms? 
Why Picasso’s creativity appears more powerful than that of Pissarro? All of 
these questions may be responded in “intellectualist terms”, yet the thing is, 
what we formulate in words is a late outcome of preferences already formulated 
on a more basic level. That is, even when I think I can provide reasons for such 
judgments we have to realize that they are “just” had as background supposi-
tions, which, however, remain silent in narratives and in such a way invisible to 
observer.  
The “just doing” in its various versions, understood as a form of automatici-
ty, is by no means trivial12. Automaticity frees mental spaces for more complex 
operations. If it were not the case we would have to permanently process the 
sensory data in consciousness, check them in memory, or question them in 
thought. Not only would this be too time and energy consuming, but it would 
also be like a computing machine processing data. Human mentality simply 
does not function that way. If it did, we would not only be running behind in 
whatever action we undertake but we would not be able to adapt to environ-
mental, social and cultural circumstances in an adequate way.  
Unlike authors who identify the background primarily with physical skills, I 
view it as a capacity for routine practices in figuring out what is going on in the 
environment, for making guesses about what is relevant for us, and for 
(re)acting in an adequate way. Motor skilled behaviour can then, at best, be 
taken as a useful analogy –a metaphorical illustration of what it should primari-
ly denote: an automatic, that is, instant and effortless, coping with the world 
that includes cognition as much as motion.  
 
We can say, in that sense, that we talk with ease when we walk; that we under-
stand sentences as we grasp things; that greeting neighbours is like chewing food; 
that posing questions is somewhat like kicking the ball; that saying ‘Hi’ and ‘Bye’ is 
as effortless as switching the light on and off; that ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ is no different than 
nodding with the head; that watching weather forecasts on TV is like drinking a soft 
drink; that interacting with people that annoy you is like eating food which you do 
not like; that listening to someone in small talk is like licking ice-cream; that recog-
nition of a familiar face is like hearing a familiar melody; that calculating small 
amounts of time or money is as easy as fastening buttons; that conversing on the 
 
 
12 Extensive research on this topic has been done by J. A. Bargh and his collaborators. See, for instance, 
Bargh (1994), Bargh and Chartrand (1999), and Bargh and Fergusson (2000). 
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phone is like driving the car. Our words ‘roll’ in conversation as pedals turn in cy-
cling; our perceptions wander through space spontaneously as our bodies balance 
in it; memories come in just as we inhale fresh air; we understand humour with 
ease when we smile. Basically these illustrations show us that we know how to be-
have and what to do in particular situations that represent challenges for the cogni-
tive person, and that we make use of available solutions from the repertoire of 
backgrounded possibilities with the same ease as routines which are typical of mo-
tor skills. This is not just to say that we do the former in a way analogical to the 
latter, but that there must be the same basic mechanism that brings them about. 
(Radman, 2012: 235-236) 
 
It seems that Alva Noë is even more radical on this point (or maybe just 
more consequent). He for instance claims that, in some sense, “just talking” 
can be viewed as barking, and remarks:  
 
[M]uch talking is more like barking than it is anything like what the linguists have in 
mind. Moreover, a good part of what enables me to understand what you say is 
that I already know what you are going to say before you say it! I never even en-
counter the problem of needing to assign a meaning to your utterance on the basis 
of prior knowledge of the words and the rules for their combination. That problem 
just does not arise” (2009: 108).  
 
Furthermore, he says:  
 
One of the very many false ideas about language is that its primary function is to 
express information or communicate thoughts. Speech has many functions, but 
surely a large part of it is more like the grooming behaviour of chimpanzees or the 
shepherding behaviour of dogs than it is like reasoned discourse among parliamen-
tarians. […] The bulk of what we say and do each day is more like grunts and sig-
nals baseball players use to indicate who’ll catch the pop fly than it is like a genuine 
conversation (2009: 107).  
 
I am convinced that not even thinking is exempt from this. We think the 
way we breathe ad we imagine with effortlessness we digest.  
What we basically understand under the automatism of behaviour is that 
our coping in the world mostly bypasses consciousness and thought. Can we 
then not next to the “language of contemplation”’ also talk about the “language 
of coping”? Should we not also introduce the notion of the “language of talk” 
(the one that would accompany “barking” with gesture) rather than the some-
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what elusive “language of thought”? Is it not equally legitimate to talk about 
the “language of emotion” that has its “word” in everything we do? Can we not 
conceive of the routines of navigating familiar spaces and the rituals of ordinary 
conversations as a language of habituation that is perfectly operative without 
conscious thought? I believe that when philosophers relate something as com-
plex as speaking to something as biologically simple as barking, and affiliate 
remembering and dining, seeing and reaching, greeting and grasping, and so 
on, they do not equate the former with the latter, or reduce one to the other. 
Instead, they propose the idea that our most authentic mental processes –
those that are taken as distinctive marks of our humanity, such as language 
usage or memory– are processed away from thought and conscious control, 
and are ruled by automaticity rather than deliberation. This all amounts to the 
conviction that concepts, thoughts and reflection are late products in the chain 
of mental processing. When they get shaped within experience, and when they 
become objects of awareness, much has already been cognitively carried out 
(and pre-pared) in the backstage of the mind. Rather than being preconceived 
plans for action, thoughts appear to be conscious protocols of the processes 
accomplished within the background. The once implicitly guessed is then legiti-





 Neuroscientists are prone to see an “observer” in the brain (Singer, 2002), 
an internal “interpreter” (Gazzaniga, 1998), multiple “selves” (Ramachandran 
and Blakeslee, 1998: Ch. 12), and invent other smart instances in the head in 
order to find explanation for the human instant and efficacious adaptation to 
the natural, social, and cultural world, whereby they should be paying attention 
to the background that turns out to be our major cognitive organ that does the 
“observing”, “interpreting” and “monitoring”, prompt and easy, that is, without 
having to process them in consciousness and thought. For we nowadays know 
that only a very small portion of the mind is realized in consciousness; by far 
the greatest part remains salient in its backstage; the latter is where we are to 
seek for the 'reason' of our mostly successful coping in the world. This subse-
quently means that the philosophical ambition to understand and define the 
mind exclusively in terms of conscious, propositional and deliberative mental 
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behaviour cannot be adequate any more. “If we are to understand how the 
mind, through the brain, makes us who we are, we need to consider the whole 
mind, not just the parts that subserve thinking” says Joseph LeDoux (2002: 
24)13. This echoes in a way William James’ credo “the whole man counts!” 
(Bergson, 1946: 212; also James, 1956: 92). Both sayings plea for integration 
of processes beyond the threshold of consciousness and thoughtfulness. Such a 
holistic approach, as understood from the current perspective, should thus fo-
cus on the background that constitutes most of our mentality. We are therefore 
urged to study it in the way that we nowadays study perception, memory, and 
emotion. For the background is that massive and potent mental means that 
informs the organism about the states of the world and provides the agent with 
possible modes of coping with it before they emerge in the conscious mind as 
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